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The recent release of the Covid-19 vaccine supply contract between the European Commission 
and Astra Zeneca has caused a political and media storm about vaccine production logistics and 
supply issues. A lesser noticed but controversial issue revealed by the contract is that of where 
ultimate liabilities should lie, which has potentially far-reaching consequences for the public 
purse. Many commercial contracts include so-called indemnity clauses whereby one party 
contractually agrees to cover liabilities incurred by the other. The European Commission 
accepted in Article 14 of the agreement an extremely broad indemnity of the manufacturer 
covering almost any and every defect imaginable whether that be the vaccine’s inherent 
characteristics, manufacturing / distribution, and storage issues, labelling errors or even 
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problems due to administration of the vaccine. This is a potentially significant burden to place 
on the state, and ultimately taxpayers.1 
On a cursory analysis, the position of anyone suffering an adverse effect of the vaccine is not 
changed, as they may still bring a legal claim. Indeed, from one perspective, it could be seen as 
simply a matter of shifting liabilities between equally deep-pocketed defendants, the 
manufacturer, and the public purse. In that sense, the position would seem to be compatible with 
the letter of the 1985 European Product Liability Directive, implemented across Europe to ensure 
compensation for defective products. On closer scrutiny, however, doubts do arise. Such legal 
provisions are designed to have a disciplining or deterrent impact, inciting producers to strive 
for higher standards in producing products.2 Such a preventive effect would inevitably be dulled 
by the wholescale transfer of liabilities to third parties. Is this approach really compatible with 
the spirit of provisions that were explicitly designed to establish “a fair apportionment of the 
risks inherent in modern technological production”? Insurance might have a similar effect, but 
insurance companies will often be astute to monitor risks and require measures to reduce their 
exposure.3 
There might also be concerns about the impact on public attitudes to vaccines if it is revealed 
that the producer is so reticent to stand by the quality of that product. At a time when public 
trust is in short supply, it is appropriate to question why such across-the-board legal safeguards 
have been accorded to healthcare producers, particularly given that substantial public funds have 
been expended to subsidise the research and clinical trial phase. Already in 2011, after the H1N1 
vaccine saga, very critical reports were made about the procurement process,4 including by the 
European institutions.5 There is a danger that history is again repeating itself, even though Astra 
Zeneca has committed to provide the vaccines at cost price during an (unspecified period) of the 
current pandemic. 
Why would the authorities consent to sign a supply contract on such unfavourable terms? The 
European Commission had substantial purchasing and political power and also past experience 
of procurement pitfalls. There was undoubtedly a pressing need to ensure supply of a potentially 
life-saving product (within very challenging circumstances) and the commercial balance may 
have in practice shifted to the supplier rather than purchaser. However, it is unlikely that the 
nature of that pressure could be the basis for challenging any indemnity.  
Perhaps, the potentially indemnifying party proceeded on the assumption that any litigation 
risks in this area are rather low, given the difficulties injured parties face in bringing successful 
 
1 It is also unclear due to redaction of the contract what (if any) exceptions are provided for: as a minimum 
carve-outs should be included for wilful misconduct / gross negligence by the product manufacturer. 
2 On this, see opinion of Advocate General Bot in Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-
Anhalt - Die Gesundheitskasse (Case C-503/13, 504/13) [2015] 3 CMLR 173 (CJEU) §38. AG Bot refers to the 
“preventive function” of the Directive, noting also that the producer is “in the best position to minimise 
[the risk] and to prevent damage at the lowest cost.” 
3 See discussion in D.Fairgrieve and R.Goldberg, Product Liability (3rd edn, OUP, 2020) para 7.21. 
4 See e.g. Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe, La gestion de la pandémie H1N1 : nécessité de plus 
de transparence, Document 12283, 7 June 2010.  
5 European Parliament, Rapport sur l’évaluation de la gestion en 2009-2010 de la grippe H1N1 en Europe, 9 
February 2011. 
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claims against healthcare producers.6 Indeed it is arguably neutral on the public purse whether 
an indemnity is given, or the cost of insurance is factored into the price. Due to the deterrence 
and acceptability arguments mentioned above, we believe it beneficial to keep the liability with 
the producer.  
More fundamentally, the barriers for any injured party seeking to recover court-awarded 
damages remain. It is to be hoped that there are no serious permanent side effects from the 
vaccine. However, the problematic current position underlines the need for a well-resourced 
compensation fund to be established to ensure that anyone suffering serious adverse effects 
receives adequate and fair compensation.7 The COVAX / WHO / GAVI no-fault compensation 
scheme has recently been rolled out across the 92 countries of operation,8 and surely is it not 
impossible for UK and European authorities to follow that lead either at a national or 
supranational level. 
 
6 See further D.Fairgrieve, P.Feldschreiber, G.Howells and M.Pilgerstorfer, “Products in a Pandemic : 
Liability for Medical Products and the Fight against Covid-19” (2020) European Journal of Risk Regulation 
1. Note also that the European Product Liability Directive is currently under review. 
7 Certain authors of this article have argued in favour of a bespoke COVID-19 vaccine compensation scheme, 
see D.Fairgrieve, S.Holm, G.Howells, C.Kirchhelle, S.Vanderslott, ‘In favour of a bespoke COVID-19 
vaccines compensation scheme”, The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 3 February 2021.  
8 See further www.covaxclaims.com. For a comparative view of national schemes, see S.Halabi, A.Heinrich, 
and S.Omer, “No-Fault Compensation for Vaccine Injury” The New England Journal of Medicine, 28 October 
2020; E.Rajneri, J-S.Borghetti, D.Fairgrieve and P.Rott, “Remedies for Damage Caused by Vaccines: A 
Comparative Study of Four European Legal Systems” (2018) European Review of Private Law 57. For 
national views, see P.Rott, “Compensation for Vaccination Damage under German Social Security Law” 
(2019) Vol 16 No 1 Otago Law Review 199; E. Rajneri, “Il vaccino contro il covid-19. La normativa speciale 
e il meccanismo di distribuzione dei rischi e dei benefici”, in Contratto e Impresa, 2021, forthcoming. 
